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InternatIonal CrImInal Court
ProseCutor unable to ProCeed 
wIth PrelImInary examInatIon In 
PalestIne
On April 3, 2012, the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) announced that it 
was unable to continue its preliminary 
examination in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories because it did not have authority 
to determine whether Palestine qualified as 
a “state.” The Rome Statute, the founding 
treaty of the ICC, requires such a classifica-
tion before the Court may exercise jurisdic-
tion. Instead, the OTP decided that only 
relevant UN bodies or the ICC Assembly 
of States Parties (ASP) had competence to 
make that determination. The Prosecutor’s 
decision raises a new legal question that the 
Rome Statute does not appear to answer: 
who has authority to determine whether 
Palestine qualifies as a state for the pur-
poses of the Court’s jurisdiction?
The question of Palestinian statehood 
in the ICC context arose after January 22, 
2009, when Palestine lodged a declaration 
accepting ICC jurisdiction under Article 
12(3) of the Rome Statute. Specifically, 
Palestine sought an ICC investigation into 
alleged war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed during Operation 
“Cast Lead,” the 2008-2009 Israeli offen-
sive in the Gaza Strip. ICC jurisdiction 
requires that either a “State” (under Article 
12) or the UN Security Council (under 
Article 13(b)) confer jurisdiction. Given 
that the UN Security Council has not 
referred the situation in Palestine to the 
ICC and Palestine has not become a State 
Party to the Rome Statute, the only way 
to obtain ICC jurisdiction is through an 
Article 12(3) ad hoc declaration. Article 
12(3) provides for acceptance of ICC juris-
diction by a “State which is not Party 
to this Statute,” and the present debate 
revolves around whether Palestine quali-
fies as such a state.
In response to the OTP’s decision, some 
legal scholars and civil society organiza-
tions have argued that the OTP should 
have referred the question to ICC judges 
for a judicial determination rather than 
to the UN or ASP for a political decision. 
Advocates of the judicial approach point to 
Article 19(3) of the Rome Statute, which 
provides that “the Prosecutor may seek a 
ruling from the Court regarding a question 
of jurisdiction.” ICC jurisdiction could 
arguably be considered a question of fact 
that must be submitted to the judges for an 
impartial judicial decision.
Supporters of the judicial approach 
also fear that a political determination will 
indefinitely deny victims an opportunity 
for justice while political bodies attempt 
to resolve the complex issue of Palestinian 
statehood. Referring the decision to politi-
cal bodies could be viewed as a delay tactic 
intended to avoid making a politically 
unpopular decision. There are also con-
cerns that leaving this decision to political 
bodies will undermine the judicial inde-
pendence of the Court. The Court’s limited 
jurisdiction already projects an impression 
of bias because all of its investigations are 
currently in Africa, and any political influ-
ence over the decision to open an investi-
gation could exacerbate this problem.
On the other hand, some civil society 
organizations supported the OTP’s decision 
to refer the question to the UN or the ASP. 
Supporters of the political approach argue 
that UN bodies must recognize Palestine as 
a state before it qualifies as a state capable 
of accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC. By 
contrast, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokes-
man Yigal Palmor questioned the role of 
any international bodies, whether political 
or judicial, stating: “[i]f the [Palestinian 
Authority] has any grievance, the proper 
way to deal with it is to talk to Israel and 
try to sort this out directly. Resorting to the 
ICC or to the UN or to any far away institu-
tion . . . that’s just a waste of time.”
The OTP’s decision comes more than 
three years after Palestine accepted ICC 
jurisdiction. This delay has denied victims 
their day in court and made preservation 
and collection of evidence more difficult. 
As the ICC continues to develop and face 
new legal questions, it is important for the 
Court to resolve these issues in a way that 
maintains the independence of the Court 
and respects its goal to provide a forum 
where victims have access to justice in a 
timely manner.
Claire Grandison, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the International Criminal 
Court for the Human Rights Brief.
the ICC delIvers hIstorIC deCIsIon 
on reParatIons for vICtIms In the 
Case of ConvICted Congolese 
warlord thomas lubanga
In yet another historic first for the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) as it 
enters the second decade of its existence, 
the Court—specifically, Trial Chamber 
I—has decided upon a set of guiding 
principles to be applied to reparations for 
victims of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The 
Chamber issued its decision in August 
2012 in the context in of the situation 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), in the case of Mr. Lubanga, for-
mer President of the Union des Patriotes 
Congolais and Commander-in-Chief of its 
military wing, Force patriotique pour la 
liberation du Congo (FPLC). Mr. Lubanga 
was convicted in March 2012 of commit-
ting, as co-perpetrator, war crimes consist-
ing of enlisting and conscripting children 
under the age of fifteen years and using 
them to participate actively in armed con-
flict not of an international character in the 
DRC—a crime punishable under Article 
8 of the Rome Statute (RS), the Court’s 
founding document. In July 2012, Mr. 
Lubanga was sentenced to a total period of 
fourteen years of imprisonment. 
In rendering its decision, the three-
judge panel of the Chamber sought to 
establish reparations applicable to the 
Lubanga case specifically, which—
depending on the scope and extent of 
damage, loss, and injury—may include 
restitution, compensation, and/or rehabili-
tation, as well as other reparations of a 
symbolic, preventative, or transformative 
value. According to the panel, the very 
need for reparations reflects a growing 
consensus among the Court’s architects, 
advocates, and stakeholders that “there is 
a need to go beyond the notion of punitive 
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justice, towards a solution which is more 
inclusive, encourages participation, and 
recognises [sic] the need to provide effec-
tive remedies for victims,” which, as the 
panel recognized, is a “well-established 
and basic human right.” Though there is 
indeed a punitive element to reparations, 
which require those responsible to repair 
the harm they caused, they are ultimately 
intended to relieve suffering, afford a more 
tangible measure of justice, and contribute 
to the rebirth of affected communities. As 
a unique and key feature of proceedings, 
the success and viability of the repara-
tions system is, from the perspective of 
the panel, fundamental to the success and 
viability of the Court itself.
Within this framework, the three-judge 
panel set forth the following principles 
intended to guide a proportional, adequate, 
and prompt reparations system in the 
Lubanga case—a system designed to pro-
mote reconciliation, reflect local cultural or 
customary values (unless discriminatory), 
and be self-sustaining. According to the 
panel, the pool of those eligible includes 
both direct and indirect victims, which in 
turn includes (1) family members with a 
close personal relationship to direct victims, 
(2) any individual who attempted to prevent 
or intervene in the commission of the crimes 
for which Mr. Lubanga was convicted, and 
(3) those who suffered personal harm as a 
the result of the crimes. Reparations may 
also be granted to individuals, collectives 
of individuals, or to legal entities, which 
inter alia includes non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs), charitable and non-profit 
organizations, schools, hospitals, coopera-
tives, or microfinance institutions. 
The panel also set forth a general policy 
against discrimination or stigmatization 
based on whether the victim participated 
in proceedings, or based on such charac-
teristics as gender, age, race, colour [sic], 
language, religion or belief, political or 
other opinion, sexual orientation, national, 
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth, or 
other status. However, this does not limit 
the Court from assigning priority to victims 
who are particularly vulnerable or are in 
need of urgent assistance or medical care, 
such as children dealing with severe trauma, 
the elderly, those with disabilities, and the 
victims of sexual or gender violence. With 
regard to victims or sexual- or gender-based 
violence, the Court shall tailor its repara-
tions awards to reflect acknowledgement 
that “the consequences of these crimes 
are complicated… operate on a number of 
levels… can extend over a long period of 
time… [and] require a specialist, integrated 
and multidisciplinary approach.” When 
considering children, the Court shall use as 
guidance the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, which enshrines the fundamental 
principle of the “best interests of the child.” 
Reparations shall take into account the age 
of the child and, in the case of child soldiers, 
should emphasize rehabilitation and reinte-
gration, and seek to maximize the child’s 
personality, talents, and abilities. 
According to the panel, all damage, 
loss, or injury that forms the basis of a 
reparations claim must have flowed from 
the specific crimes for which Mr. Lubanga 
was convicted. There is no mention in either 
the Rome State or ICC Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence of the standard the Court 
must adopt in assessing the causal chain 
of a reparations claim, nor is there any 
settled standard in international law. In this 
specific case, however, the panel found that 
the Court may adopt the “direct” or “imme-
diate effects” standards, as well as the less 
rigid “proximate cause” standard. That is, 
the Court may grant a reparations claim 
provided (1) there exists a “but/for” rela-
tionship between the crime and the harm 
and (2) the crimes for where Mr. Lubanga 
was convicted were the proximate cause of 
the harm for which reparations were sought. 
The standard for evaluating claims of proxi-
mate cause is, according to the panel, “a 
less exacting standard” than proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and instead approaches 
the standard of “balance of probabilities” 
without at all compromising the fair trial 
rights of the convicted individual.
While the panel made clear that these 
principles and procedures were “limited to 
the circumstances of the present case” and 
was “not intended to affect” future cases, 
its decision will nonetheless lay a founda-
tion for what could eventually become an 
extensive line of jurisprudence coming 
out of the Court. The reparations system 
produced by this particular decision will 
undoubtedly provide guidance and inform 
decisions on victims reparations moving 
forward. In the present case, the panel 
declared Mr. Lubanga indigent, which trig-
gers the use of the Trust Fund for Victims 
(TFV)—considered the first of its kind 
in the international justice landscape—
which manages resources derived from 
voluntary contributions from states and 
individuals to fulfill the Court-imposed 
reparations system when the convicted 
individual is declared indigent. The Fund 
currently maintains a reserve for repara-
tions totaling roughly $1.5 million USD. 
85 victims have put forth claims in the case 
of Mr. Lubanga, while “many more” may 
be eligible. The Fund’s leadership hailed 
the decision, and welcomes the role it will 
play. Some external stakeholders, however, 
are more cautiously optimistic, and will 
monitor the process closely to ensure the 
Court successfully delivers on the prom-
ises to victims contained in the decision. 
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law and Co-Editor-in-Chief of 
the Human Rights Brief, wrote this column.
Ad Hoc TribunAls
EquAl TrEATmEnT for GEnocidAirEs: 
sEnTEncE EnforcEmEnT AT THE 
icTY And icTr
As the years since the atrocities of the 
1990s in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia 
increase, many of those convicted by 
the international tribunals serving sen-
tences throughout Europe and Africa have 
applied for and been granted early release. 
Government officials and the victims of the 
conflicts have expressed concern and dismay 
over these early releases, often questioning 
the rationale of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) for even considering early 
release. Yet the tribunals are tasked with 
ensuring fair and equal treatment of con-
victed persons, and have consistently upheld 
the right of convicted persons to seek early 
release, if specific criteria are satisfied. This 
right is not consistently available, however, 
and this inconsistency has the potential to 
result in unequal sentence enforcement.
As with the defense principles of due 
process and equality of arms prior to con-
viction, equality in sentence enforcement 
after conviction must operate free from a 
desire for retribution and deterrence based 
solely on the nature of the crime, taking into 
account the rights of the convicted and his 
or her ability to rehabilitate. This approach 
is not always popular, as made clear in the 
recent statements of Rwanda’s Prosecutor 
General, Martin Ngoga, who advocated that 
the ICTR reexamine the concept of allow-
ing early release for convicted genocidaires. 
In opposing the three early releases granted 
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by the ICTR thus far, Mr. Ngoga questioned 
the relevance of good conduct in prison 
after one has committed the crime of geno-
cide. If early releases are to be allowed, he 
advocates a precursory genuine apology 
to survivors and the community. Croatia’s 
president Ivo Josipovic also questioned the 
appropriateness of early release from the 
ICTY, advocating a base standard of serving 
full sentences with rare exception.
As provided in the ICTR and ICTY 
Statutes, when a person convicted by a tri-
bunal requests early release, that tribunal’s 
President decides on the appropriateness 
of the release based on recommendations 
from the state where the sentence is being 
served, after consultation with the Prosecutor 
and sentencing Chambers. The Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR and 
the ICTY provide factors that, inter alia, 
the President must take into account in 
this decision, including the gravity of the 
person’s crime(s), the treatment of similarly 
situated prisoners, the person’s demonstrated 
rehabilitation, and any cooperation with the 
Prosecutor on other cases. The tribunals also 
mandate that the convicted party complete 
two-thirds of his or her sentence before it will 
consider a petition for early release.
Another important prerequisite to 
any petition for early release is that the 
state enforcing the person’s sentence must 
approve a request for early release under 
its own law. This requirement is laid out in 
tribunal statutes and in each state’s sentence 
enforcement agreement (see Albania’s, for 
example), and is based on the statutory 
requirement that the enforcing state’s laws 
govern the sentences of those convicted 
by a tribunal. The wide variability of these 
domestic laws presents a significant chal-
lenge to equal enforcement of sentences. As 
observed by Klaus Hoffman, former Legal 
Officer at the ICTY, two men convicted of 
the same crime and sentenced to life impris-
onment may have drastically different expe-
riences depending on the country where 
they serve their sentences. One man may 
secure early release in 15 years, while the 
other may stay in prison for his entire life.
The potential for unequal sentence 
enforcement is a negative side effect of 
state-enforced tribunal sentences, and hints 
at the benefits of a sentence enforcement 
standardization effort on the part of the 
international community. As with so many 
of the concerns raised in these early years of 
international criminal jurisprudence, equality 
of enforcement is a weighty issue for the 
future credibility of the ICTY and the ICTR, 
and for the International Criminal Court 
when the tribunals complete their mandates. 
Effective standardization would ideally find 
a delicate three-way balance between pro-
moting effective punishment while equally 
enforcing sentences, respecting the frustra-
tions of victims at the early release of a 
perpetrator, and upholding the sovereignty of 
the state enforcing the sentence.
ADC-ICTY ReleAses FIRsT DeFense-
FoCuseD legACY DoCumenT
In a notable milestone for the legacy of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Association 
for Defense Council Practicing before the 
ICTY (ADC-ICTY) announced the release 
of its “Manual on International Criminal 
Defense” in late 2011, officially launch-
ing it in February 2012. The Manual is 
the product of the EU-funded War Crimes 
Justice Project, a joint effort by the ADC-
ICTY and UN Interregional Crime and 
Justice Research Institute, coordinated 
by the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe. Following a path 
laid clear by the Tribunal’s “ICTY Manual 
on Developed Practices (2009),” the Manual 
on International Criminal Defense (Manual) 
is the first legacy document of its kind to 
function as a treatise on international crimi-
nal defense proceedings before the ICTY.
The Manual is specifically tailored to 
the unique challenges of defense activities 
before the ICTY and is intended to be of 
practical use for domestic war crimes courts 
in the region of the Former Yugoslavia. It is 
also designed to be a resource for interna-
tional criminal defense jurisprudence writ 
large. The Manual’s diverse pool of authors 
are defense lawyers who have practiced 
before the ICTY and national courts in the 
region of the Former Yugoslavia, represent-
ing the collective defense experience of the 
ADC-ICTY over its decade of existence, as 
well as the experience of previous defense 
counsel since the founding of the ICTY.
The Manual presents prose-based expla-
nations and case-specific interpretations 
of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPEs), information that would 
take months to compile for even an expe-
rienced defense lawyer beginning practice 
at the ICTY. The explanations are tailored 
to reflect the ICTY’s blend of civil and 
common law traditions, providing lawyers 
with extensive practice experience in either 
tradition with an expedited primer in an 
often unfamiliar system of procedure. This 
civil law-common law blend has presented 
difficult hurdles since the ICTY’s first case, 
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, where both the 
Accused’s counsel and the Trial Chamber 
came from civil law systems in which a 
guilty plea is typically an evidentiary con-
sideration for the court, rather than a miti-
gating factor in sentencing. The Accused’s 
counsel and the judges had to learn the 
common law concept of a plea agreement 
to practice before the Tribunal, as required 
by Rule 62 ter of the RPEs. The Manual 
effectively reduces the barriers to entry in a 
legal practice area typically hampered by a 
lack of experienced legal professionals.
Structurally, the Manual outlines every 
stage of a defense proceeding before the 
Tribunal, from initial indictment through 
post-conviction appeals in domestic legal 
systems carrying out ICTY sentences. Each 
chapter provides practical tips from ICTY 
cases to explain the applicable RPEs and 
novel legal concepts, such as Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, that have emerged more recently. 
Furthermore, the Manual makes occasional 
distinctions between ICTY practices and 
those adopted by the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.
Recognizing the broad stakes of inter-
national criminal trials, the Manual begins 
with an extensive look at reasonable doubt, 
the prosecution’s standard of proof for ulti-
mate guilt and underlying facts, highlight-
ing the ICTY’s strict interpretation of the 
presumption of innocence. Following an 
explanation of affirmative defenses, the 
Manual provides a guide to developing a 
case theory and strategy, complete with a 
chapter on the logistics of defense investi-
gations that details methods for adequately 
taking advantage of the defense’s reliance 
on the Office of the Prosecutor when build-
ing a defense, while also conducting inde-
pendent investigations. The Manual then 
provides a basic approach to structuring a 
legal argument, before extensively covering 
the ICTY’s permissive standards for accept-
ing evidence, and noting the criticism this 
approach often faces. The use of witnesses 
is covered next, followed by an explana-
tion of the witness examination process. 
The Manual then explains the plea agree-
ment concept and the associated sentencing 
process, finishing with the appeals process, 
and various post-conviction issues.
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The ICTY’s contribution to the budding 
field of international criminal defense is 
enduring and highly regarded, as evidenced 
in frequent citation by the other ad hoc and 
hybrid courts and the International Criminal 
Court. The ICTY was the first international 
criminal justice court, and the experience it 
imparts in the Manual will serve to memo-
rialize its accomplishments, while promot-
ing the right to a fair trail that is pivotal to 
the legitimacy of the international criminal 
courts that have formed in its wake.
Benjamin Watson, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, covers the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the 
Human Rights Brief.
InternatIonalIzed trIbunals
InvestIgatIons, MIsconduct, and 
uncertaInty In the eccc regard-
Ing case 003
Case 003 in the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has 
been surrounded by controversy since it 
began in year 2009. The case has further 
aggravated tensions between the inter-
national community and the Cambodian 
government. Recent disputes over the 
closing and subsequent re-opening of the 
investigation in Case 003 and the appoint-
ment of International Co-Investigating 
Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet highlight 
the challenges facing the ECCC. These 
tensions underscore the ongoing divide 
between the tribunal’s international and 
national judges and the difficulties the 
ECCC will likely continue to face.
The co-investigating judges are tasked 
with investigating cases brought by the 
co-prosecutors and issuing charges. 
Co-investigating Judges Blunk and You 
closed the brief investigation in Case 
003 on April 29, 2011, without issuing 
indictments, despite international pres-
sure to continue the investigation. The 
judges did not indicate why they closed 
the investigation, so the Office of the 
Prosecutor appealed the decision, argu-
ing that the judges should have performed 
further investigations into the alleged 
crimes. Subsequently, civil parties and 
international NGOs accused two of the 
investigating judges of misconduct. Judge 
Blunk, one of the international co-inves-
tigators, resigned in late 2011, and Judge 
Kasper-Ansermet was appointed in his 
place as reserve international judge. Both 
civil parties and international NGOs allege 
that the judges post-dated documents 
and failed to properly investigate 
suspects who had close ties to the current 
Cambodian Government.
Under Article 3 of the Agreement between 
the UN and the Cambodian government 
establishing the ECCC, each chamber is 
composed of an equal number of national 
judges and international judges. The judges 
are nominated by the UN and confirmed 
by the Cambodian Supreme Council of the 
Magistracy. Any order or verdict issued by 
the ECCC requires a majority vote, includ-
ing at least one national judge. This sys-
tem was designed as a compromise with 
the Cambodian government in an attempt to 
ensure the ECCC’s independence from the 
national judiciary system. Most recently, the 
Supreme Council of the Magistracy withheld 
the required confirmation, thereby blocking 
the nomination of Judge Kasper-Ansermet, 
despite the fact that the UN approved his nom-
ination and authorized his re-opening of the 
investigation in Case 003. Because of the con-
tinual refusal of the Cambodian government 
to cooperate with Judge Kasper-Ansermet’s 
appointment and investigation into Cases 
003 and 004, Judge Kasper-Ansermet resigned 
from his appointment, effective May 4, 2012.
Although the names of suspected indi-
viduals are confidential, some informa-
tion regarding the suspects in Case 003 
has leaked, indicating the seriousness of 
the crimes for which the accused could be 
charged. After the Co-Prosecutors prema-
turely released the names of the suspects 
in Case 003, it became evident that many 
suspects still hold political positions in the 
Cambodian Government, which is perhaps 
why the Prime Minister of Cambodia does 
not want the case to continue. However, 
it is unclear why Judge Blunk sided with 
national Judge You to close the investigation 
in April 2011. Cambodian and international 
NGOs strenuously protested the closure, 
and urged the UN to investigate both judges 
and to re-open the case. Judge Kasper-
Ansermet re-opened the investigation into 
Case 003 in December 2011over objections 
from national co-investigating Judge You and 
the Cambodian Government, who viewed the 
investigation as a ploy by the international 
community to influence national politics.
Citing the failure of Judge Blunk to prop-
erly investigate, Judge Kasper-Ansermet 
found “good cause” to re-open the investi-
gation. The Open Society Justice Initiative 
(OSJI), a monitoring and reporting NGO, 
argued that both Judge Blunk and national 
Judge You deliberately misled the Court to 
“create the illusion of a genuine investiga-
tion.” OSJI alleged that the judges added 
documents to the case file and back-dated 
other documents. However, the Cambodian 
government asserts that the Court should 
finish with Case 002 and dismiss Cases 
003 and 004. Because national judges still 
hold political seats in the national judicial 
system, OSJI is concerned that the ability 
of the court to continue the re-opened inves-
tigation will be compromised by national 
political pressure and the resignation of 
Judge Kasper-Ansermet.
The disagreement between the two co-
investigating judges and the ability of 
the Cambodian government to force the 
resignation of international Judge Kasper-
Ansermet calls into question the credibil-
ity and independence of the ECCC. As a 
result, the investigation may not be seen as 
complete or in the interest of the victims. 
Although the ECCC opened in 2003, only 
five individuals have been accused, and 
only one has been sentenced. As an inter-
national tribunal, the ECCC faces tensions 
between the impartiality requirements 
of international justice and the pull of 
national politics. If the Cambodian govern-
ment continues to block the appointment 
of international judges willing to investi-
gate Cases 003 and 004, future investiga-
tions might not occur and Case 003 may be 
further delayed. The genocide perpetrated 
by the Khmer Rouge regime occurred over 
thirty years ago. The longer the victims 
wait for justice, the less poignant it will be, 
especially as the perpetrators age and their 
ability to stand trial decreases.
Furthermore, the ECCC was designed 
as a hybrid tribunal to ensure judicial inde-
pendence and to provide a model of reform 
to the ailing Cambodian justice system. 
Achieving international justice objectives 
such as ensuring fair trials and eliminating 
impunity for crimes against humanity and 
genocide are hindered if the ECCC can-
not remain impartial to national political 
concerns. If the pre-trial chamber and trial 
chamber can break away from the interna-
tional and national divide, investigations 
into Case 003 may remain open, despite 
Judge Kasper-Ansermet’s resignation. But 
as tensions remain high, the outcome in 
this case and the overall legacy of the 
ECCC continues to be uncertain.
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Judgment SummarieS: 
international Criminal tribunal 
for rwanda
the ProSeCutor v. grégoire 
ndahimana, CaSe no. 
iCtr-01-68-t
Gregoire Ndahimana was brought 
to trial at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on three 
counts related to crimes against Tutsis. 
The Prosecution charged him with geno-
cide or, in the alternative, complicity in 
genocide, and extermination as a crime 
against humanity. Ndahimana was a 
member of the Mouvement Démocratique 
Républicain (MDR), a political party in 
Rwanda, as well as the bourgmestre of 
Kivumu commune. The charges against 
him concern events that took place in 
Kivumu commune between April 6 and 
April 16, 1994. In particular, the charges 
related to attacks on the Nyange Parish, 
where hundreds of Tutsis had taken ref-
uge, that occurred on the April 15-16, 
culminating in the physical destruction 
of the church while the refugees were 
sheltering inside of it and resulting in the 
death of approximately 2,000 Tutsi men, 
women and children. While a major-
ity of the Trial Chamber found that 
the Prosecution failed to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused com-
mitted, planned, instigated, or ordered 
the attacks against Tutsis at the Nyange 
Parish, it found that he bore superior 
responsibility for the members of the 
communal police who carried out the 
attack on April 15, and then he aided and 
abetted the attack that took place on April 
16. Based on its findings that the attacks 
of April 15 and 16 amounted to genocide 
and extermination as a crime against 
humanity, and that Ndahimana acted with 
the requisite mens rea, the majority con-
victed him of the first and third counts 
brought by the Prosecution. Because 
complicity in genocide was charged only 
in the alternative, the Chamber dismissed 
this charge. Ndahimana was sentenced 
to fifteen years in prison with credit 
for time already served. Judge Florence 
Rita Arrey issued a dissenting opinion 
in which she contended that Ndahimana 
should have been convicted for commit-
ting genocide and extermination as a 
crime against humanity based on his par-
ticipation in a joint criminal enterprise 
(JCE) aimed at exterminating Tutsis in 
Kivumu commune.
Much of the evidence put forth by 
the Prosecution was intended to establish 
that Ndahimana took place in a series 
of meetings between April 11 and April 
16 at which a JCE was formed with the 
purpose of transporting a large number 
of Tutsis to Nyange Parish for the pur-
pose of exterminating them. However, 
while the majority of the Trial Chamber 
determined that, although the evidence 
established that the accused participated 
in several of the relevant meetings, and 
that a JCE did exist among certain of 
the other persons who attended the same 
meetings, the Prosecution failed to estab-
lish that Ndahimana “shared the intent 
to destroy the Tutsi population in whole 
or in part.” While conceding that, in 
“most cases, genocidal intent will be 
proven by circumstantial evidence,” the 
majority stressed that, “in such cases, 
the finding that the accused possessed 
the requisite mens rea must be the only 
reasonable inference from the total-
ity of the evidence.” Here, the major-
ity could not reach such a conclusion 
and thus determined that the accused 
was not a member of the joint criminal 
enterprise described by the Prosecution. 
As stated above, Judge Arrey issued a 
dissenting opinion on this point, find-
ing that circumstantial evidence did in 
fact establish that Ndahimana possessed 
genocidal intent. Among other factors, 
Judge Arrey pointed to the fact that the 
accused “met regularly with the members 
of the criminal enterprise throughout 
the relevant period, before, during, and 
immediately after the killings,” suggest-
ing he “accepted the plan, and that his 
participation in the enterprise was valu-
able, and possibly essential;” that he 
failed to assign the communal police 
officers under his control to protect the 
refugees at the parish, despite threats 
against them; and that, following the 
destruction of the church on April 16, 
Ndahimana and other members of the JCE 
“celebrated the successful implementa-
tion of the criminal plan” over drinks. 
Based on this and other evidence, Judge 
Arrey concluded that “by an unknown 
time on 14 April 1994 Ndahimana shared 
the intent of his co-perpetrators to destroy 
in part or in whole the Tutsi community 
of Kivumu commune.”
Despite the majority’s finding that 
Ndahimana lacked genocidal intent, it 
nevertheless determined that he bore 
responsibility for crimes committed on 
April 15 and 16. With respect to the 
attack on the parish on April 15, the 
Trial Chamber first found Ndahimana’s 
alibi evidence to be “reasonably possi-
bly true,” and thus held the Prosecution 
failed to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was physically present 
at the parish during that day’s attack. 
However, the Trial Chamber found that 
the accused bore superior responsibility 
for members of the communal police that 
directly perpetrated the attacks on April 
15. To establish superior responsibility 
under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute, 
the Court must find: (1) a superior-
subordinate relationship existed, meaning 
that the “superior must have had effec-
tive control over the subordinates at the 
time the offence was committed;” (2) the 
superior knew or had reason to know that 
the criminal acts were about to be or had 
been committed by his subordinates; and 
(3) the superior failed to take necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent such 
criminal acts or to punish the perpetra-
tors. According to the Trial Chamber, 
Ndahimana exercised effective control 
over the communal police through his 
role as bourgmestre of the commune, as 
he had the authority to assign the police 
to specific tasks and to promote and 
demote police members. Furthermore, 
the Chamber held that circumstantial 
evidence established that the accused had 
reason to know that the police had com-
mitted attacks against Tutsis at the parish 
on April 15 resulting in the death of hun-
dreds of Tutsi refugees, as Ndahimana 
arrived at the scene several hours after 
the attack and the “situation at the parish 
[at that time] must have been so chaotic 
that any person coming there would 
have known that a large scale attack 
had occurred that day.” In addition, the 
Chamber noted that Ndahimana sub-
sequently met with at least three of the 
persons directly involved in the attack. 
Finally, the Chamber determined that, 
although Ndahimana had the author-
ity to punish the perpetrators of the 
attack, he took no action to do so. The 
Chamber then went on to determine that 
the April 15 attack amounted to geno-
cide, as the physical perpetrators of the 
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attack acted with the intent to destroy the 
Tutsi population in whole or in part. The 
Chamber also determined that the attack 
amounted to extermination as a crime 
against humanity, as those carrying out 
the attack intended to carry out killing 
of Tutsis on a massive scale and knew 
that their actions formed part of a wide-
spread attack against the civilian Tutsi 
population on ethnic grounds. Thus, the 
Chamber concluded that Ndahimana bore 
superior responsibility for genocide and 
extermination as a crime against humanity 
in relation to the events of April 15.
Turning to the physical destruction 
of the church on April 16, the Chamber 
first determined that the communal 
police over whom Ndahimana exer-
cised effective control did not partici-
pate in this attack, and thus the accused 
could not be held liable for the attack 
based on a theory of superior responsi-
bility. Furthermore, while the Chamber 
determined that Ndahimana was physi-
cally present for both the planning and 
the execution of the April 16 attack, 
as stated above, the majority of the 
Chamber determined that Ndahimana did 
not possess the specific intent to com-
mit genocide and thus could not be held 
responsible for genocide based on his 
role committing, planning, ordering, or 
instigating the destruction of the church. 
Nevertheless, the majority did determine 
that those responsible for carrying out 
the attack did act with genocidal intent, 
and that Ndahimana was aware of the 
genocidal intent of those carrying out 
the attack. Furthermore, the Chamber 
determined that Ndahimana’s physical 
presence during the attack amounted to 
tacit approval or encouragement of the 
attack, particularly when combined with 
the fact that he did not take any action 
to punish those involved in the previous 
day’s attack. Thus, the Chamber deter-
mined, Ndahimana was responsible for 
aiding and abetting genocide based on 
the destruction of the church on April 
16. The Chamber also determined that 
Ndahimana aided and abetted extermi-
nation as a crime against humanity on 
April 16, as he must have known that the 
physical perpetrators intended to carry 
out killing on a massive scale and that 
their actions formed part of a widespread 
attack against the Tutsi civilian popula-
tion on ethnic grounds. Interestingly, 
although the crime against humanity of 
extermination does not require that the 
accused intended to destroy a protected 
group in whole or in part, the Chamber 
did not consider whether Ndahimana 
bore responsibility under an alternate 
mode of liability, such as participation 
in a JCE or planning, even though it had 
dismissed those modes of liability in 
relation to the genocide charges based 
on a finding that the accused lacked the 
requisite genocidal intent. Notably, the 
Prosecution charged Ndahimana with all 
forms of liability available under Article 
6(1) of the ICTR Statute, as well as under 
Article 6(3).
Turning to sentencing, the majority 
of the Chamber determined that fifteen 
years was an appropriate sentence tak-
ing into the account the gravity of the 
crime and aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. In particular, while not-
ing that the charges of which the accused 
was convicted were extremely grave, 
it also took into account “the nature of 
the accused’s participation.” By contrast, 
because she found that the accused “was 
not a mere accomplice in the genocide at 
Nyange parish, but a principal perpetra-
tor of that crime,” Judge Arrey concluded 
that she would have “sentenced him to 
a longer term of imprisonment than did 
the [m]ajority,” but did not specify the 
amount of years she found appropriate.
Erin Neff, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for 
the Human Rights Brief. Katherine Anne 
Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
Dominique ntawukulilyayo 
v. the Prosecutor, case no. 
ictr-05-82-a
On December 14, 2011 the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its 
judgment in the case against Dominique 
Ntawukulilyayo, who served as sub-pre-
fect of the Gisagara sub-prefecture in 
Rwanda from 1990 through 1994. In 
August 2010, the Trial Chamber found 
Ntawukulilyayo guilty of genocide pur-
suant to Article 6(1) of the Statute of 
the Tribunal for his role in the mass kill-
ings of Tutsis at Kabuye Hill on April 
23, 1994. Although Ntawukulilyayo was 
originally charged with genocide, com-
plicity in genocide, and direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, the Trial 
Chamber only convicted the accused 
of genocide. Specifically, the Chamber 
found that, by instructing Tutsi refugees 
to move from Gisagara Market to Kabuye 
Hill and by transporting soldiers to the 
hill who subsequently killed hundreds 
of these refugees, Ntawukulilyayo was 
guilty of ordering and aiding and abetting 
the killings. For his participation in these 
events, the Trial Chamber sentenced 
Ntawukulilyayo to twenty-five years’ 
imprisonment. Because the Prosecution 
had charged complicity in genocide as 
an alternative charge to genocide, the 
Trial Chamber dismissed that count upon 
determining that the accused was guilty 
of genocide; the direct and public incite-
ment to genocide charge was dismissed 
based on a lack of evidence supporting 
the charge. On appeal, Ntawukulilyayo 
raised six challenges to his conviction 
and sentence. In part, he alleged that 
the Trial Chamber erred in finding that 
he instructed Tutsi refugees to move 
to Kabuye Hill and that he transported 
soldiers to the hill who later committed 
the attack. Ntawukulilyayo also alleged 
that the he had not been given suffi-
cient notice as to the charge of ordering 
genocide as a specific mode of liabil-
ity. Ntawukulilyayo asked the Appeals 
Chamber to acquit him on all counts or 
significantly reduce his sentence. In its 
judgment, the Appeals Chamber affirmed 
the conviction for aiding and abetting 
genocide but reversed the conviction 
for ordering genocide and consequently 
reduced Ntawukulilyayo’s sentence to 
twenty years’ imprisonment.
Ntawukulilyayo did not succeed in 
contesting the Trial Chamber’s finding 
that he arrived in Gisagara on the after-
noon of April 23, 1994, gathered Tutsi 
refugees in the market, and ordered them 
to move to Kabuye Hill. Ntawukulilyayo 
challenged the testimony of Prosecution 
witnesses, claiming that they neither cor-
roborated one another nor were cred-
ible in their own right, and also chal-
lenged the finding that the testimony 
of the seven Defense witnesses who 
claimed not to have seen him in the mar-
ket was of limited probative value. The 
Appeals Chamber found that although 
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the accounts of the Prosecution wit-
nesses did contain a minor discrepancy 
as to whether or not Ntawukulilyayo 
used a megaphone to address the refu-
gees in the market, they contained a 
significant number of similarities. Thus, 
the Appeals Chamber determined that 
the Trial Chamber did not err in finding 
the testimony “consistent and convinc-
ing” and also agreed that the discrep-
ancies could reasonably be explained 
by varying vantage points and the pas-
sage in time. Furthermore, the Appeals 
Chamber recalled that the Trial Chamber 
has the discretion to decide “whether 
corroboration is necessary and to rely on 
uncorroborated, but otherwise credible, 
witness testimony.” Similarly, although 
Ntawukulilyayo attacked the credibility 
of two Prosecution witnesses for incon-
sistencies between their testimony in this 
trial and the earlier Kalimanzira trial, 
the Appeals Chamber found that the 
Appellant failed to demonstrate that the 
Trial Chamber improperly assessed the 
variances. Ntawukulilyayo argued that 
the testimonies contained fundamental 
discrepancies as to the date and time that 
he allegedly arrived at the market and 
the number and category of security per-
sonnel that were with him and therefore 
should not have been considered credible. 
However, the Appeals Chamber agreed 
with the Trial Chamber that any incon-
sistencies could reasonably be explained 
by the passage of time and other “vary-
ing circumstances” and recalled that “the 
purpose of appellate proceedings is not 
for the Appeals Chamber to reconsider 
the evidence and arguments submitted 
before the Trial Chamber.” It also was not 
persuaded by Ntawukulilyayo‘s argument 
that the Trial Chamber erred in finding 
that the testimony of Defense witnesses 
who never saw Ntawukulilyayo at the 
market did not cast sufficient doubt on 
the Prosecution’s case. It determined that 
none of the Defense witnesses were in 
a position to observe the market during 
the entire time in question and found “no 
error in the Trial Chamber’s preference 
for positive eyewitness testimony.”
Ntawukulilyayo was also unsuccess-
ful in arguing that the Trial Chamber 
erred in finding that he arrived at Kabuye 
Hill in the late afternoon or early eve-
ning of April 23, 1994 with Callixte 
Kalimanzira and an unknown number 
of soldiers, stopped briefly at the hill 
to drop off the soldiers, and left shortly 
thereafter. Ntawukulilyayo again argued 
that Prosecution witnesses did not pro-
vide credible testimony and that the Trial 
Chamber failed to properly assess the 
exculpatory evidence submitted by the 
Defense. The Appeals Chamber found 
that the Trial Chamber did in fact address 
the variances in witness testimony as 
to the time of day that Ntawukulilyayo 
arrived at the hill, the type of vehicle 
he arrived in, the number and category 
of security personnel with him, and the 
presence of Kalimanzira. Therefore, it 
considered the issue on appeal to be 
“whether [the testimonies] differ to such 
extent as to render the testimonies of 
the witnesses incompatible with one 
another.” As to time of day, although 
the Appeals Chamber found that the 
Trial Chamber should have more explic-
itly addressed the discrepancies, it noted 
that the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that 
Ntawukulilyayo arrived “[i]n the late 
afternoon or evening of Saturday 23 
April 1994” reflects that it was aware of 
the inconsistencies and was satisfied with 
the explanation that that these differences 
could be explained by the passage of time 
and the traumatic nature of the events. 
As to the type of vehicle Ntawukulilyayo 
arrived in, the number and category of 
security personnel with him, and the 
presence of Kalimanzira, the Appeals 
Chamber considered Ntawukulilyayo’s 
claim that the Trial Chamber ignored 
material inconsistencies in testimony to 
be similarly unfounded. It found that 
“varying vantage points, the passage of 
time and the traumatic nature of the 
events” were indeed reasonable expla-
nations for these minor differences in 
testimony.
Although the Appeals Chamber found 
that Ntawukulilyayo did not success-
fully demonstrate that the Trial Chamber 
erred in any of its factual findings, it 
did find that Ntawukulilyayo was not 
given sufficient notice as to the charge 
of ordering genocide. It considered that 
the lack of notice effectively meant that 
Ntawukulilyayo was not given adequate 
opportunity to raise a defense to the 
charge at trial and that the Trial Chamber 
therefore erred in holding him respon-
sible for ordering the killings on Kabuye 
Hill. Paragraph 5 of the Indictment stated 
that “the accused . . . is individually 
responsible for the crimes of genocide 
or complicity in genocide because he 
instigated, ordered, committed or oth-
erwise aided and abetted in the plan-
ning, preparation or execution of these 
crimes” and concluded with a statement 
that “[t]he particulars that give rise to 
[Ntawukulilyayo’s] individual criminal 
responsibility are set forth in paragraphs 
6 through 22.” While these later para-
graphs outline the particular acts that 
are the basis for the charges of commit-
ting, instigating, and aiding and abetting 
the killings on Kabuye Hill, they do 
not plead material facts that specifically 
describe how Ntawukulilyayo ordered the 
killings. At trial, the Prosecution argued 
that the general mention in Paragraph 
5 of ordering as a mode of liability 
was sufficient to put Ntawukulilyayo on 
notice that he was charged with ordering 
the events described in subsequent para-
graphs, including the killings on Kabuye 
Hill. On review, the Appeals Chamber 
began by recalling that “the charges 
against an accused and the material facts 
supporting those charges must be pleaded 
with sufficient precision in an indictment 
so as to provide notice to the accused.” It 
did not agree that the general language 
of the Indictment in the preamble clearly 
indicated that ordering as a mode of 
liability was intended to apply to all of 
the specific events outlined in later para-
graphs. Even considering the Indictment 
as a whole, the Appeals Chamber also did 
not find that the material facts pleaded in 
the rest of the Indictment reasonably lead 
to the conclusion that Ntawukulilyayo 
was charged with ordering the killing. 
It found that none of the references to 
Ntawukulilyayo giving orders “involve 
[him] ordering anyone to kill members 
of the Tutsi group at Kabuye Kill, or 
otherwise ordering an act or omission 
with the awareness of the substantial 
likelihood that Tutsis would be killed at 
Kabuye Hill in the execution of that order 
by the persons who received it.” Since 
“[a] Trial Chamber can only convict the 
accused of crimes that are charged in 
the Indictment,” the Appeals Chamber 
granted Ntawukulilyayo’s appeal on this 
ground and reversed the Trial Chamber’s 
conviction for ordering genocide.
In light of the fact that its decision 
to reverse the conviction for ordering 
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genocide removed the only direct — as 
opposed to accessorial — form of respon-
sibility for which Ntawukulilyayo had 
been found guilty, the Appeals Chamber 
reduced his sentence to twenty years’ 
imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber 
also confirmed that the sentence will be 
further reduced by the period of time 
that Ntawukulilyayo has already spent in 
detention since his arrest in October 2007.
Sara Harlow, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for 
the Human Rights Brief. Katherine Anne 
Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
Charles Taylor ConviCTed on 
all Charges
On April 26, 2012, the Trial Chamber 
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) delivered a judgment against 
Charles Taylor. The SCSL is the first 
internationalized court to convict a head of 
state since the Nuremberg trials following 
World War II. The indictment was issued 
on March 7, 2003 and the case commenced 
on June 4, 2007. Charles Taylor was con-
victed of eleven charges, including crimes 
against humanity, violation of Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions and 
of Additional Protocol II, and other seri-
ous violations of international humanitar-
ian law committed between November 
30, 1996 and January 18, 2002, when the 
Court had jurisdiction. Although the trial 
phase is over, many issues remain, includ-
ing subsequent appeals and compensation 
for the victims.
Charles Taylor led the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPLF) from 1989 to 1997 
and was the president of Liberia from 1997 
to 2003. In addition to participating in 
and leading the civil war in Sierra Leone, 
Taylor also participated in the civil war in 
Liberia, where he backed and helped lead 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). 
The civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
were closely related in terms of politi-
cal ideology, guerilla tactics and players. 
Additionally, both conflicts were bloody 
and gruesome, leading to the death of an 
estimated 50,000 people in Sierra Leone 
and leaving thousands of others mutilated 
by rebel tactics that included cutting off 
limbs as punishment. Both countries are 
still fragile and many still fear Taylor’s 
ability to control events in West Africa. 
After his indictment and subsequent arrest, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone requested his 
transfer to the Hague.
The Defense acknowledged that during 
the indictment period under the jurisdic-
tion of the court, November 30, 1996 to 
January 18, 2002, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes were committed, but 
claimed that Taylor had no responsibility. 
The Prosecution had to prove, “(i) that the 
crimes were actually committed; (ii) that 
the crimes fulfill all the legal elements of 
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute; and (iii) 
that there is a nexus between the alleged 
crimes and the Accused.” The prosecution 
presented evidence of forced rape, ampu-
tations, the trafficking of illegally mined 
diamonds known as blood diamonds, arms 
deals, and embezzlement. Throughout the 
trial, 115 witnesses testified about the 
atrocities committed during the civil war 
under Taylor’s supervision and direction, 
the alleged diamond trading, and Taylor’s 
financial embezzlement during his reign as 
president. The witnesses included victims, 
former child soldiers and U.S. nationals. 
Taylor testified on his own behalf over the 
course of seven months.
The Trial Chamber found Charles 
Taylor guilty of all eleven counts in the 
indictment. The eleven charges included: 
acts of terrorism, murder, violence to life, 
harm to the health and physical or mental 
well-being of persons, rape, sexual slavery, 
outrages upon personal dignity, violence 
to life, other inhumane acts, conscripting 
or enlisting children under the age of 15 
years into armed forces, enslavement, and 
pillage. The Trial Chamber also examined 
evidence of events that occurred prior 
to the Indictment period to establish “by 
inference the elements of criminal conduct 
that occurred during the material period, 
or demonstrating a consistent pattern of 
conduct.” In light of the evidence prior to 
and during the indictment period, the Trial 
Chamber found that Taylor provided sup-
port and arms and ammunition to the RUF 
and that he directed military personnel. 
Sufficient evidence also linked Taylor to 
the blood diamond trade with the RUF. In 
conclusion, the Trial Chamber found that 
Taylor “was aware of the crimes commit-
ted by RUF/AFRC forces against civil-
ians…as early as August 1997.”
Article 6(3) of the Statute states that a 
superior is responsible for the actions of 
subordinates “if the superior knew or had 
reason to know that his or her subordinate 
was about to commit crimes prohibited 
by the Statute or had done so, and the 
superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent or pun-
ish the perpetrators.” The Trial Chamber 
found that although Taylor had “substantial 
influence” over the RUF, he did not have 
“effective command,” so he was not crimi-
nally responsible for crimes under Articles 
2, 3 and 4 committed by subordinates. 
Additionally, the Trial Court found that the 
prosecution failed to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Taylor “participated in a 
common plan” to commit crimes alleged in 
the Indictment, so he was not found guilty 
of Joint Criminal Enterprise. However, 
the Trial Chamber found that prosecution 
did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
under Article 6(1), Taylor is guilty of aid-
ing and abetting and planning the commis-
sion of the crimes in the Indictment.
As the Charles Taylor case draws to a 
close, issues concerning reparations for 
victims as well as the role of the Court in 
the reconciliation process of Sierra Leone 
are now at the forefront. The SCSL has 
already sentenced eight other leaders, but 
the success of the Court in terms of bring-
ing relief for the victims is questioned. 
Because Taylor’s fortune amassed during 
the civil war has not yet been discovered, 
it is difficult to envision financial repara-
tions for the victims. However, while the 
Court may not be able to bring compensa-
tion to the victims, this case has set the 
important precedent that a head of state 
may be convicted by an international tri-
bunal and brought to justice.
Michelle Flash, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Internationalized 
Tribunals for the Human Rights Brief.
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